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Non-pecuniary Value of Employment and Natural Resource Extinction 
 
Summary 
We assume that people value employment not only to earn income to satisfy their 
consumption needs but also as a means of community/social involvement that provides 
socio-psychological (non-pecuniary) benefits. We show that the latter incentive can 
encourage full employment harvesting resources and explain why poor resource-based 
communities may exhaust a natural resource in a finite time even if there is a 
sustainable path of resource consumption available. We show that communities could 
sustain their natural resources by using outside-the-community employment and 
economic diversification, but, to be effective, such policies must ensure that the outside 
wage rate and the initial capital stock are above certain minimum levels, which will be 
higher the longer these policies are delayed. 
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Ecologists often argue that the extinction of natural resources is a consequence of our 
rather self-centered behavior and partial view of the ecosystem. In order to satisfy human needs, 
many people behave as if they are independent of the ecosystem that provides the basic 
materials to sustain life, with materialistic needs causing the problem.  
In this paper we take a different view. We argue that in closed, resource-based 
communities, particularly those in developing nations, the satisfaction of non-materialistic 
needs, or, more specifically, the psychological and sociological benefits of being employed, 
may explain the extinction of natural resources. This can occur if employment is both a source 
of earning income to satisfy materialistic needs as well as the principal means of community 
involvement or a social norm. We go beyond the standard neoclassical income-leisure choice, 
which considers nonwork time as leisure and values it by the cost of income foregone. We 
follow sociologists and psychologists (see, for example, Whelan (1994) and Agerbo et al 
(1997)), who recognize that, in addition to being a source of income and material satisfaction, 
employment can provide non-materialistic satisfaction. The socio-psychological benefits of 
employment can be particularly strong in poor, rural resource-based (RRB) communities where 
working is a social custom or norm and an important constituent of one’s identity. In such 
communities being unemployed is a deviation from the social norm, entailing loss of utility.  
Allowing for the non-pecuniary benefits of employment can give rise to “full 
employment obsession” in such resource-dependent communities. If labor is the principal input 
(or “effort”) that determines the rate of resource harvest, a “full employment obsession” can 
explain why it may be optimal to extinct a resource in a finite time even if an alternative 
sustainable path is available.  However, sustainability may require the community to restrict 
employment level below its “full” level for a transitory period to allow the resource stock to 
grow.  Thus, we offer a “full-employment” alternative explanation to the ecologists “selfish” 
explanation for exhaustion or extinction of natural resources. Even if communities recognize 
the ecological constraints on regenerative capacity of the resource, the negative 
socio-psychological effects of unemployment on individuals’ subjective well-being may make 
it too hard for RRB communities to tolerate unemployment to let the resource stock regenerate. 
In such situations, employment outside the resource sector and economic diversification may 
satisfy both resource sustainability and full employment goals.  
Economics literature provides few studies of conditions for the optimal extinction of a 
natural resource in a finite time. Clark (1973) and Spence (1973), the classic papers, showed 
that when there is purely an economic motivation (specifically, maximization of the present 
value of the stream of profits from resource sales), if the resource owner’s discount rate is 
 1higher than the growth potential (intrinsic/biological rate of growth) of the resource, then it is 
economically optimal to deplete the resource stock to extinction in a finite time. Spence (1973) 
corroborated this result numerically in the case of the blue whale, which was then an 
endangered species
1. Brander and Taylor (1998) analyzed the dynamic interactions of an 
open-access renewable resource and people to explain the collapse of the Easter Island 
civilization, showing that the resource and population dynamics had an oscillatory behavior, 
and that a change in parameters, reflecting climatic changes on the  island, allowed the 
population or the resource stock to fall below critical levels for regeneration, leading to the 
extinction of the population or the resource.  The key feature distinguishing our paper is the 
explanation for an excessive supply of effort (labor) because of the socio-psychological effects 
of employment as asocial norm on the well-being of resource harvesters in a RRB community.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews some of the empirical 
evidence for non-pecuniary value of employment and discusses why it may be particularly 
important in RRB communities. Section 3 uses the standard bionomic model of a renewable 
resource to show the incompatibility of full employment with resource sustainability when 
non-pecuniary benefits of employment are strong, and identifies the condition under which 
resource extinction in finite time is optimal. Section 4 explores the possibilities of outside 
employment and economic diversification as potential options to achieve both full employment 
and resource sustainability, and shows that for such options to be effective the outside wage 
rate and the initial capital stock should exceed certain minimum levels. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Non-pecuniary Value of Employment  
Employment is a principal means for people to connect and become involved with 
communal activities. In turn, community involvement directly or indirectly brings the 
individual a sense of self-esteem, self-respect, belonging, identity, recognition, reputation, 
friendship, security, and status, all of which are ingredients of one’s quality of life and 
                                                  
1 Note that the well-known case of extinction of a population under the open-access regime (sometimes 
known, incorrectly, also as the “tragedy of commons”) may be viewed as a special case of this result 
when the discount rate approaches infinity. However, Cropper and Lee (1979) show that this result need 
not hold when the harvest price is allowed to be inversely related to the harvest rate rather than assumed 
to be constant, as in Clark (1973). In that case, the result holds only for sufficiently small initial stocks 
but not for sufficiently large initial stocks even if the discount rate is infinite (see also Farzin (1984) for 
the role of the initial stock size for the effect of the discount rate on resource depletion). In a related 
paper, Smith (1975) explains the mass extinctions of mega fauna in America during the late Pleistocene 
by using an open-access resource (free-access hunting) model. He shows that if the average biological 
growth rate at zero stock level is low and less than the equilibrium harvest per unit biomass, the 
extinction of a species will occur due to hunting pressure.  
 
 2satisfaction (Jahoda (1988)(1982)(1981)).
2 Being employed is an essential determinant of 
happiness; the unemployed have significantly lower well-being scores in the social 
psychological and labor economics literature (see, for example, Fryer and Payne (1986), 
Feather (1990) and Argyle (2001)). Further, Lucas, et al (2004), find strong statistical evidence 
that the adverse effect of unemployment on individuals’ subjective well-being persists even 
after they become employed again. More interestingly, empirical work in labor economics 
literature has established that unemployment is strongly negatively correlated with individual 
well-being, even after controlling for income and other individual characteristics. In other 
words, the unemployed are generally worse off than the employed, and by more than their 
lower income would predict (see, for example, Clark and Oswald (1994), Korpi (1997), 
Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998), Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001)(2003), and 
Clark (2003) and references cited therein).  For example, Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1998) 
used panel data on life satisfaction from German-Socio-Economic Panel for 1984-1989, where 
the individual’s subjective well-being was measured on an ordinal scale from 0 to 10.  After 
controlling for income and various observed individual characteristics and specific fixed 
effects, they found that (a) being unemployed has a significant and substantial negative effect 
on satisfaction, and (b) the pecuniary costs of unemployment, occurring directly through 
reduced income, are much smaller than the non-pecuniary costs, occurring indirectly through 
reduced well-being. They estimated that income would have needed to be increased by a factor 
of seven in order to generate an increase in satisfaction large enough to offset the adverse effect 
of unemployment.  Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2001) came to similar conclusions. 
Using the Euro-Barometer data on individual life satisfaction, ordered on a four-point scale for 
12 European countries for the period 1975-91, they found that, controlling for the income loss 
and other indirect effects, being unemployed has a strong negative effect on well-being. Based 
on Di Tella et. al’s estimated happiness function, Frey and Stutzer (2002) calculated the 
compensation variation for being unemployed rather than holding a job and noted that “a move 
from the lowest income quartile to the highest income quartile would not be enough to offset 
the adverse effect of unemployment, suggesting that unemployed people suffer high 
non-pecuniary costs (p.402)”. These results suggest that being unemployed significantly 
reduces people’s well-being, even when receiving the same income as when employed.  As Di 
Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald (2003, pp. 819-820) note “Being unemployed is much worse 
than is implied by the drop in income alone. The economist’s standard method of judging the 
disutility from being laid off focuses on pecuniary losses. According to our calculations, that is 
                                                  
2 For a general and insightful treatment of the effects of identity on economic behavior and outcomes, 
see Akerlof (2000). Also, see Akerlof and Kranton (2003)(2005) for an analysis of the effects of 
workers’ identity on incentives to exert effort, wage rate variation, and firms’ optimal management 
strategies. For a survey of the social psychological consequences of unemployment and implications for 
behavioral macroeconomic model and policy see Darity and Goldsmith (1996).  
 3a mistake, because it understates the full well-being costs, which according to the data, appear 
to be predominantly nonpecuniary.”  The facts that in advanced industrial countries, where 
social safety nets cushion joblessness, some individuals prefer to be employed with earnings 
less than the unemployment benefit or to engage in voluntary work are evidence of 
non-pecuniary value of employment.
3  Furthermore, the presence of non-pecuniary value of 
employment is strongly suggested by Mulligan’s (1998) insightful empirical study of the 
dramatic increase in civilian work in the United States during World War II.  Ruling out the 
changes in workers’ budget sets (the after-tax real wages were substantially lower than either 
before or after the war) or other pecuniary explanations such as wealth effects of government 
policies, wage-induced intertemporal substitution, and changes in the nonmarket price of time, 
she concluded that non-pecuniary motives such as patriotism and changing discrimination 
against women can explain the phenomenon.  
Finally, using data from the Alaska salmon fisheries, which have been subject to entry 
limitations since 1975, Karpoff (1985) tested the hypothesis that fishermen receive significant 
non-pecuniary benefits by estimating the present value of the expected rent stream from fishing 
and examining whether permit prices reflected a premium above what monetary income alone 
would suggest. He found that the continued presence of many low-income fishermen in the 
fisheries was evidence that they, at least, derive non-pecuniary benefits from fishing.  
The negative socio-psychological effects of unemployment on well-being are likely to 
be particularly strong in closed RRB communities, when compared, for example, with the 
effects on working populations in cosmopolitan urban areas. The reason is that in such 
communities, being productive is often a social norm or custom, giving the individual a sense 
of belonging and identity. Being unemployed is considered a deviation from the norm, and 
carries with it significant negative psychological and sociological effects, which every 
community member tries to avoid.
4 This is less true in urban areas with diversified economies 
that are open to trade with outside, and where the role of the individual is less apparent to the 
rest of society. As noted by Veblen (1899, P.69 and P.75) long ago, in urban areas individuals 
are often recognized for their consumption behavior, so that “distinction in consumption” or 
“conspicuous consumption” is a means of gaining recognition. It seems therefore reasonable to 
suppose that the social norm of work can be especially strong in closed RRB communities; that 
is, a large portion of their active populations adhere to it.  Interestingly, in a revealing empirical 
study of the psychological effect of unemployment on individual well-being, Clark (2003) 
                                                  
3  Moffitt (1983) found strong empirical support for the existence of welfare stigma among eligible but 
non-participants in AFDC-U, the welfare program for which families with an unemployed male were 
eligible.    
4 In many RRB communities, especially in developing countries, sharing the efforts needed for resource 
harvesting is a social norm which in turn stems from the community norm of sharing the harvest. Diverging 
from the norm of sharing efforts can inflict social shame and cause one to be ostracized.  
 4finds a strong and statistically significant positive correlation between the negative 
psychological effect of unemployment and the degree of adherence to the social norm of 
employment. Accordingly, being unemployed is likely to be particularly stigmatic in RRB 
communities.   
 
3. Full-Employment Obsession and Resource Extinction 
3.1 Sufficient Condition for Extinction in finite time 
Dasgupta and Maler (1995, P. 2373) emphasize that “poor countries are for the most part 
biomass-based subsistence economies, in that their rural folk eke out a living from products 
obtained directly from plants and animals.”  Many rural communities in poor countries depend 
on natural resources, so it may be thought that residents of such communities would have 
sustainability as a major social and economic goal. However, if the non-pecuniary 
(socio-psychological) value of employment is strong, full employment can become an equally 
important goal. Achieving sustainability and full employment simultaneously is not a problem 
if the community’s initial resource base is sufficiently large and the resource regenerative 
capacity is sufficiently high; if not, there may be a conflict between sustainability and full 
employment.  This section identifies the precise conditions that make extinction of the resource 
in a finite time socially optimal.   
  Economics literature traces sustainable resource allocation to the so-called Ramsey 
(1928) problem: seeking an optimal path along which the resource stock (in his case, 
manufactured capital) stock converged to some positive level, (i.e., an interior optimal 
stationary state) regardless of the initial size of the stock. In our case, an interior optimal 
stationary state is a sustainable stock level. However, if the optimal policy is full employment, 
the resource may become extinct.   
An optimal path that leads to resource extinction in finite time requires a marginal 
productivity of the resource stock that is less than the time discount rate.  (see, for example, 
Clark (1973) and Spence (1973)). In our case, the optimality of extinction occurs regardless of 
the time discount rate, and we show that under certain conditions full employment until 
resource extinction is socially optimal (full employment obsession).
5  
Consider an RRB community with a constant population (labor force) size ofE . The 
community owns and lives off of a stock of a single renewable resource (e.g., a fishery or 
                                                  
5 It has been well known that in the game theoretic framework the resource extraction towards finite 
time extinction can occur as a result of “individual” rationality under open-access regime. Gordon 
(1954) and Hardin’s (1968) influential paper, “the tragedy of commons”, are among the early works 
alluding to this, followed by a number of rigorous analyses including Dasgupta (1982), Cornes and 
Sandler (1983)(1996), and Sorger (1998), among others. It should be emphasized, however, that in the 
present study there is no open–access to the resource and no strategic interactions among the 
community members who are assumed to fully and collectively own the resource.   
 5forest) the size of which is denoted by at time t. The change in the resource stock over 
time is described by  
() 0 St≥
  
        (1)  =− ∀  ( ) [ ( )] [ ( ), ( )]     0, St GSt HEt St t≥
where is the natural growth function,  is the harvest function where  () GS (,) HES ≤≤ 0( ) Et E 
is the level of “effort”, which we simply assume to consist only of the community labor force at 
timet . We make the following assumptions: 
 
(A1):    is concave in S  (i.e.,  () GS 0 SS G ≤ ) and there is a unique biological carrying 
capacity  such thatGk ,   for all > 0 k () 0 = () 0 GS > 0 Sk < < , and .  (0) 0 G =
 
(A2):  is an increasing function and strictly concave in  (,) HES E  (i.e. 
).  0, 0, 0 ESE E HHH >> <
 
(A3):    For any given , the full-employment  harvest rate  ≥ 0 0 S (,( ) ) HESt exceeds the 
population growth , so that (( ) ) GSt = −  ( ) [( ) ] [,( ) ] 0 St GSt HESt < , thus permitting finite time 
exhaustion of the resource stock.  Notice that this assumption can hold if the resource growth 
rate is sufficiently low relative to the stock effect on harvest ( (,) S H ES), in which case the 
curve of harvest function at full employment, (,) HES, may everywhere lie above that of 
population growth function, .   () GS
  Assumptions (A1) and (A2) are quite general. On the other hand, assumption (A3) 
reflects the situation when full employment and sustainable resource use are incompatible. Our 
objective is to show under what condition resource exhaustion in a finite time is socially 
optimal. 
 Denote  by   the community’s instantaneous social welfare function (, ) WCE
6, where 
 and   are the aggregate consumption and employment. We assume that:  ≥ 0 C 0 E ≥
(A4):    is jointly concave in C and (, ) WCE E , , and   if > 0 C W >< () 0 E W ˆ ()() E EC <> , 
where ˆ() E C is the critical level of employment for which  ˆ (,) 0 E WC E= and satisfies ˆ () 0 EC ′ < . 
  
  This social welfare function can be derived consistently from an extended individual 
utility function  (,, ) UU c z m =  where   is  consumption,  0 c ≥ 0 z Tl = −≥   is leisure time, 
which is equal to the fixed total time endowment T less labor time  , and   captures 
the non-pecuniary effects (NPE) of employment, which is assumed to increase with one’s 
0 l ≥ () 0 ml ≥
                                                  
6  The time arguments of the functions are omitted whenever no confusion arises. 
 6community involvement and hence labor time (i.e. () 0 ml ′ > ).  The utility function is assumed 
to satisfy the usual assumptions that it is increasing in each of its arguments (i.e., 
) at decreasing rates (i.e.,  ) 
and that both leisure and NPE are complements with consumption (i.e.,  )
0, 0, 0, as 0 czmc UUUU c >>>→ ∞ → 0, 0, 0 cc zz mm UUU << <
0, 0 cz cm UU >>
7. One 
can then rewriteU in the reduced form of  u  so that the overall, or net, 
marginal utility of labor time is
(c,l)= U(c,T - l,m(l))
zm u/ l = dU/dl = -U +U m (l) ′ ∂∂ , where the first term on the 
right-hand side is the marginal disutility of labor and the second term is the marginal utility of 
labor that arises from the non- pecuniary value of employment. We assume, as is plausible, that, 
at any given consumption levelc, for sufficiently large values of   the first term dominates the 
second one (implying that at the margin labor becomes a net source of disutility, 
) and vice versa for sufficiently small  ,  so that for each  , there exists 
a unique such that 
l
(,) / 0 l < uc l u ≡∂ ∂  
l= -U +U m (l)>( )0
l c>0
l(c) > 0 ˆ
zm u(c,l)/ ′ ∂∂ ≤   as  . That is,  is the 
threshold labor time, at consumption level , so that the marginal disutility of labor exactly 
offsets its marginal utility.   
l < ( )l(c) ≥ ˆ l(c) ˆ
c
  As shown in Farzin and Akao (2004a), at sufficiently low wage (and hence 
consumption) rates, leisure may lose its desirability to such an extent (i.e.,  becomes so 
small) that work can even become a source of utility (i.e.,
z U
u(c,l)/ l >0 ∂ ∂ ), so that one chooses to 
work as much as possible ( ). The social welfare function   inherits  these 
properties. Specifically, employment itself enhances the community’s well-being if its level is 
below the critical level
lT = (, ) WCE
ˆ E , or if, for any given employment level, the consumption level is too 
low.  In fact, the direct link between the two functions becomes obvious if we adopt the concept 
of utilitarian social welfare and assume that the community’s populationE consists of identical 
individuals. In that case, we have  == (, ) (/, / ) ( , ) W C EE u C E E EE u c l  
and =⋅ = ˆˆ () (/) . ( ) EC E lC E Elc ˆ . 










max [ ( , ), ]
subject to  ( ) [ ( )] [ ( ), ( )],
              0 ( ) ,0 ( ),   0;
              (0) [0, ] given.
t
Et WHES Ee d t
St GSt HEt St
Et E St t
SS k
    (2) 
Define , i.e. w is a reduced form of the social welfare  ≡ (,) [(,) , ] wES WHES E
                                                  
7 For more details about the properties of the extended individual utility function, see Farzin and Akao 
(2004a)(2004b). 
 7function W , and satisfies . Then, the Hamiltonian of problem (2) is:  < 0 SS w
 





∂ is the co-state variable and measures the shadow price of the resource stock. The 
necessary conditions for a solution of problem (2),  , are that, at each  : 
** (( ) ,( ) ) EtSt 0 t ≥
  λλ Ψ= Ψ




       (5) 
** () () [ () , () , () ] / . ttE t S t t λρ λ λ =− ∂ Ψ ∂  
Denoting by  (,) ESλ    the implicit function solving ((,) ,,) 0 E ES S λλ Ψ =   , we refer to 
(,) ESλ    as the stationary point of . It is worth noting that the maximum condition (4) does 
not necessarily hold at the associated stationary point  , implying that the 
employment constraint may be binding (i.e., 
Ψ
* (( ) , ( ) ) EE S t t λ =  
() ,o r  0 0 Et E t = ∀≥ ) at the optimum. This is 
because the Hamiltonian as a function of E  may not be concave at the stationary point, due to 
the concavity of the harvest function  in (,) HES E . When the maximum condition holds 
with = () Et E, it indicates that the community gives priority to full employment rather than to 
sustainability.  The following proposition identifies the precise conditions under which this 
occurs. 
 











E H ES E w ES
HE S wE S
>      (6) 
 the optimal path is the full- employment obsession path. 
  
  Proof:  See Appendix A1 for the proof. 
The economic interpretation for Proposition 1 is straightforward once we note from 
(3) that a small increase in employment level  E  has two beneficial effects on the current social 
welfare: by increasing the harvest and hence consumption level and through its non-pecuniary 
effect  ( ).  But, by raising the harvest level, it also lowers the resource stock, 
which involves a cost amounting to 
=+ EH E wW HW E
( , ) E HE S λ  in utility terms. Both the marginal benefit ( ) 
and cost (
E w
E H λ ) of employment decline as employment level is increased. Accordingly, 
Proposition 1 states that full employment obsession, and thus finite time extinction of the 
resource, occurs when the (employment) elasticity of the marginal cost of employment (the 
first term of the LHS of (6)) always exceeds the elasticity of its marginal benefit (the second 
term).  In other words, in response to a given percentage increase in employment level, the 
 8latter declines proportionally less than the former does, implying that the marginal net benefit 
from employment will always be increasing with employment level. We shall refer to condition 
(6) as condition for full employment obsession.
8
Two important points follow from this condition. First, it neither involves the natural 
growth function   nor the time discount rate () GS ρ , respectively because of assumption (A3) 
and the fact that along the optimal path the harvest rate at any time is at its maximum feasible, 
i.e. at the full-employment, level, (,) HES, so that a change in the discount rate has no effect on 
the optimal harvest path.  Therefore, the mechanism causing the finite time resource extinction 
in our model differs sharply from the ones noted in the literature.  Here it is the desirability of 
employment as an independent determinant of well-being that drives the economy to the 
full-employment path and leads to resource extinction in finite time. Second, we note that 
condition (6) cannot hold if  ≤ (, ) 0 E WC E  and ≤ (, ) 0 CE WC E .
9 But,  is the basic 
premise of the standard labor supply theory that regards labor only as source of disutility and 
ignores the positive socio-psychological effect of employment on well-being, and if it bears 
any truth at all, it should be about the preferences of urban population in rich industrialized 
societies. This suggests that the condition for full employment obsession is more likely to hold 
for preferences of the poor people in RRB communities, where one expects  .
( , ) 0 E WC E <
> (, ) 0 E WC E
10   
 
3.2.   A Specific Illustration 
In this subsection, we present an example illustrating the full-employment obsession 
path as the optimal path. Let us specify the functions in Problem (2) as follows:  
(1) The natural growth function takes the Logistic form: 
  ρ ⎛⎞ =− > > ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
() 1 ,  , 0
S
GS r S r k
k
      ( 7 )  
The natural (intrinsic) growth rate,r , is the resource’s maximum potential reproductive rate. So, 
                                                  
8 Technically, the condition requires that at the stationary point , the harvest function   be more 
concave in   than the welfare function w is, implying that 





> 0  at that point.  
9 To see this formally, recall that ≡ = (,) [(,) ,] (,) wES WHES E WCE.Differentiate (3) with respect toE to 
have , and use this to obtain  λ =− + WH W H CE E E
() ( )
() ( ) () ( )
λ
λλ λ λ
−+ + + −−−
−=−





EW H W H W H W CC E CE E C EE EE EH Ew EH EE EE EE
HwH H EE E E
E W HW H W E W HW H W CC E CE E EE CC E CE E EE EH W EH W EE C EE E
HH H H H EE E E E
<
where all functions are evaluated at  λ λ   ((,) ,,) ES S . 
10 It is also worth noting that condition (6) does not hold if the harvest function is convex or linear in E  
(i.e., if  ), although the latter has been commonly assumed in the literature.   0 HEE≥
 9the inequality r ρ >   implies that the resource is economically productive, thus further 
sharpening the distinction between our model and the previous studies of the condition for 
finite time resource extinction. 
 
(2) The harvest function has a Cobb-Douglas form: 
       (8)  (,) ,  ,,> 0 ,   1 ; HES ES
αβ γγ α β α β =+ ≤
Where it is noted that the harvest is bounded above by  (,) HH E k = . The necessary condition 
for finite time extinction of the resource is  → = ∞ 0 lim ( , ) SS HE S .
11 The Cobb-Douglas harvest 





















assumption (A3) holds, implying that the resource is exhausted in a finite time. (See Appendix 
A2 for the proof.)  
 
(3) The social welfare function also takes a simple Cobb-Douglas form: 
 
  (, ) ,  , 0 ,   1 .
CE
CE C E WCE C E
η η η ηη η => + <
=
                                                 
    (9) 
It is concave, increasing in consumption and employment, and  bounded 
below. Further, it satisfies   and  .  Especially because of the latter two properties, 
the Cobb-Douglas social welfare function suits our purpose particularly well. For, in view of 
the discussion in Section 3, it can be attributed to preferences of an RRB community so acutely 
poor that a rise in employment level always has a positive effect on the community’s well-being 
and its marginal value of consumption; that is, for all feasible paths of resource use , 
 and  never switch signs.
(0, ) ( ,0) 0 WEW C =
0 E W > 0 CE W >
(,) CE
0 E W > 0 CE W >
12  
The reduced form of the social welfare function is 
 
      (10)  (,) [(,) , ] .
CC E C wES WHES E E S




11 To see this, suppose that  ξ = <∞ → lim ( , ) 0 HE S SS . Then, we can approximate the harvest function 
with ξS and the natural growth function with in a neighborhood of the origin. Thus,  rS
( ) ξ =− ≈ −   () (,) SG S H E S S r . With a linear differential equation, it takes infinite time to exhaust the 
resource. 
12 Notice that the boundedness condition,  (0, ) 0 WE = , is necessary to have an optimal path with finite 
time extinction. On the other hand, the condition  = ∞ → lim ( , ) 0WC E c C   defies the optimality of 
resource extinction in finite time, without non-pecuniary effects of employment. 
 10  α αη η η αη α
−−






−   
the condition for full employment obsession (6) simplifies to
13
η αη α +> () EC        ( 1 1 )  
That is, for this specific case, the net marginal welfare effect of employment will always be 
positive if the elasticity of social welfare level with respect to employment  η αη + () EC exceeds 
the elasticity of the harvest level, α . 
14
 
4. Policy Options for Sustainability 
  In this section, we explore some economic policies that can induce an RRB 
community to adopt a sustainable path of resource use.  We do this in the context of the specific 
functional forms (7)-(9) used in the previous section. We assume that before a policy measure 
is implemented the condition ( ) Ec η αη α + >  holds, so that the optimal path is that of full 
employment obsession with resource exhaustion in finite time. 
  It is worth noting that this condition consists of two elasticities of the welfare 
function, E η and C η , and one elasticity of the harvest function,α . Thus, to have a potential to 
prevent the finite time resource extinction, two broad groups of policy measures may be 
distinguished. One group consists of policies that can affect the community’s preferences 
and/or its harvesting technology in such a way that at least one of the three elasticities is 
suitably changed so as to defy the condition( ) Ec η αη α + > .  By itself, this requirement rules 
out a number of policy options as ineffective. For example, it is easy to show that any economic 
assistance to the community in the form of a commodity grant or subsidy that proportionally  
 
                                                  
13 For the proof of the existence of an optimal path see Appendix A3. 
14 Notice, again, from (11) and  1 c η < that the full-employment obsession, and hence the finite time 
extinction, can occur only if employment also directly enhances the individual’s utility and therefore the 
community’s welfare, i.e., only if 0 E η > . 
 11augments consumption will not help to prevent resource extinction.
15 Similarly, unless it 
sufficiently reducesα , a technological assistance that is confined to resource harvesting may 
not only fail to induce resource use sustainability, it can even worsen the situation because it 
could accelerate the pace of resource exhaustion. Examples of such technologies are those of 
more efficient but “effort-neutral” or “effort-augmenting” harvesting technologies, and, 
perhaps ironically, may also include the technologies that enhance the resource stock (for 
example, radar-based fishing vessels capable of locating fish stocks by radar). The other group 
of policies are those that take the community’s preferences and harvesting technology as given, 
at least in the short run, and resort to formal labor markets as mechanisms to absorb what would 
otherwise constitute excessive effort (from the sustainability viewpoint) in the resource sector.  
  In what follows we do not explore potential policies in the first group as they would 
involve changing consumption habits (preferences)-much in accord with ecologists’ advice- 
with the effect to lower the value of  C η , or changing the community’s attitude towards 
employment (social norm of work), with the effect to lower the value of  E η , or both. Such 
policies would aim to encourage changes in cultural values. Accordingly, besides involving 
economic incentives, they involve complex and community-specific social and political 
incentives whose effects may take a long time to evolve, perhaps longer than the resource can 
survive. Instead, we concentrate on two economic policy options in the second group and 
derive conditions under which they can lead the community to a full employment and yet 
sustainable path of resource use. The main difference between the two options is that one of 
them considers employment opportunities outside the community while the other aims at 
additional employment opportunities through economic diversification. 
 
 
                                                  
15 It can also be shown that when economic assistance to the community is in the form of a real flow of 
lump-sum transfers or foreign grants (denoted by  ), one has   ()0 , 0 Xt t ≥∀ ≥
ηα α η ϕ
− − ⎛⎞ −= − + + ⎜⎟
⎝⎠
1, E
X Ew EH X EE EE
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Since ϕ = →∞ lim ( ) 0 x x , it follows that such policies can be 





0 ) if the rate of transfer relative to harvest rate is at any time 
sufficiently large and ifη α < E . However, ifη α ≥ , E  the full employment obsession path is optimal and 
resource extinction occurs in finite time, no matter how large the flow of transfers.   
 124.1 Outside Employment Opportunity  
Suppose that an outside labor market is opened to our RRB community. Denote 
byω > 0 the constant wage rate in units of harvest.
16 Notice that any optimal path is a full 
employment path because now people can work without necessarily reducing the resource 












max [ ( ( ), ( )) ( ( )), ] ,
subject to  ( ) [ ( )] [ ( ), ( )],
             0 ( ) ,0 ( ), for each  0;
              (0) 0 given.
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St GSt HEt St
Et E St t
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   (12) 
The Hamiltonian is 
 
      (13)  λλ Ψ= + − (,,) (,) [() (,) ]
O ES w ES GS HES
where   denotes the welfare function with outside employment opportunity, and is 
given by   
(,)
O wE S
ηη ω =+ − (,) [(,) ( ) ] .
CE O wE S H E S E E E     (14) 
 
Assuming the existence of an optimal path and denoting it by , 
if
** (( ) ,( ) ) EtSt
*() 0 EE t ≥> , we have  
 
ηη λη ω ω λ
− Ψ= + − − −
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which implies
17  
         ( 1 5 )   ω −>
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or, by substituting for
α β αγ
− =












E       ( 1 5 ’ )  
This sets an upper bound on employment in the resource sector . Since 
* E
                                                  
16 The assumption of constant real wage rate is made for expositional simplicity. The results that follow 
also hold for time dependent wage rates () t ω . 
  
17 Notice that because of the marginal social cost of employment due to the negative stock effect of increased 
harvest rate (i.e.,  E H λ − ), the optimal employment allocation requires that the marginal product of 
employment in the resource sector to exceed the outside wage rate . 
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* , an optimal path satisfies 
*() St
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Let  () S ω be the function that solves ()
β α αγ ω − ⎡⎤ − = ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
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⎥    (17) 
(Note in particular that for 0 () S ω , ()
β α αγ ω − ⎡⎤ − = ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦
1
1
00 0 () /() , 0 GS H S S S .) 
Then, we have  
Proposition 2: If  0 () S ω ω ≥ , then  , i.e. along an optimal path the resource stock 
never declines below the initial stock level. 
≥
*() St S 0
Proof: By (17) and (16), if  , then  . ￭  =
*() St S 0 ≥  *() 0 St



















⎥ , the outside employment opportunity absorbs what would 
otherwise be excessive effort (
* EE − ) in the resource sector, thereby ensuring both full 
employment and sustainability of resource use. The required minimum outside wage rate 
depends on the initial resource stock,  , the elasticities of the harvest rate with respect to 
effort and the resource stock, 
0 S
 and  α β , the efficiency of the harvesting technology, γ , and the 
resource’s biological characteristics as reflected by its natural (intrinsic) growth rate, r , and 
carrying capacity, k , which influence . Noting that () GS
0 lim ( )
S S ω
→ = ∞
18, it follows that when 
the initial resource stock is very small (for example, because economic measures to encourage 
resource conservation have been long neglected), then very high outside wage rates are needed 
to induce the RRB community to move to a sustainable path of resource use. It is also easy to 
verify that 00 0 ( )/ 0, ( )/ 0, and  ( )/ 0 SS r S k ω γω ω > ∂∂ <∂∂ <
                                                 
∂∂ , implying respectively that the 
required minimum outside wage rate will be higher, the greater is the efficiency of harvesting 
technology, but the lower are the resource’s intrinsic growth rate or carrying capacity.  
 
r = ∞
18 This follows from 
 
(1 ) / ( 1 ) /(1 ) 1/ /(1 ) lim ( ) /( ) lim / ( ) lim [ /(1 )] /
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 144.2 Economic Diversification  
Next, we consider the option of economic diversification by creating a new economic 
activity; for example, a formal manufacturing sector.  This sector produces a homogenous good 
according to production function , and accumulates capital according to   (,) FKL
 
  (,) 0 ,  0 , KF K Lc c =− ≥ ≥   = ≥ 0 (0) 0 given KK .
19   (18) 
 
where is capital stock,   is labor input, and   is the consumption  of the good 
expressed in units of harvest equivalent
≥ 0 K ≥ 0 L ≥ 0 c
20. Thus, the community’s instantaneous welfare can be 
written as , where, as usual,  (, WH cE L ++ ) (,) HH E S = is harvest and   is labor input into 
the resource extraction sector.  
E
To simplify the analysis and make the results comparable with the case of outside 
employment opportunity analyzed in the previous subsection, we assume that the production 
function has a form of  , where is an increasing function ( ). This 
implies that the marginal and average products of labor are equal to
= (,) () FKL fKL f ()0 fK ′ >
() f K  and increase over 
time as capital is accumulated.   
By the same argument as in the previous subsection, an optimal path entails full 
employment, i.e., ELE + =  for all   Thus, the social planner’s problem is   0. t ≥








0 () , ()
00
max [ ( ( ), ( )) ( ), ] ,
subject to  ( ) [ ( )] [ ( ), ( )],
              ( ) [ ( ), ( )] ( )
             0 ( ) ,0 ( ),   0;
              (0) 0,  (0) 0 given.
t
ct Et WHEt St ct Ee d t
St GSt HEt St
Kt FKt E Et ct
Et E St t
SS KK
 (19) 
Assume that this problem has a solution   Then, let us fix the path of 
capital stock at its optimal path, , and consider the partial problem: 
** * * ( ( ), ( ), ( ), ( )). EtctStKt
*() Kt
                                                  
19 Note that we are implicitly assuming that investment in the industry sector is irreversible. We are also 
assuming that the initial capital stock, , is given to the community either as a capital grant from the 
government or as foreign aid.  
0 K
20 Alternatively, we can assume the manufactured good and the resource harvest are perfect substitutes 
in consumption. Farm raised fish and harvested wild fish present an example. 








0 () , ()
**
0
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−                       (19’) 
Obviously,   is also a solution of this partial problem. We can now reduce 
the number of state variables in this problem to one by noting from the second constraint in 
(19’) that 
** * ( ( ), ( ), ( )) EtctSt
  == − = −   ** () ( () ,) [ () ]() () ,   () () c tc L t tf K t L tK tL tE E t     (20) 
 
and substituting from (20) in (19’) to rewrite (19’) as: 
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              (0) 0 given.
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 (21) 
Define the associated Hamiltonian by 
 
    λλ Ψ= + − (,,) (,, ) [() (,) ] ,
D ES w ESt GS HES
 
where 
ηη =+ − (,, ) [(,) ( , ) ]
C D wE S t H E S c EE t E
E
≥
  is the social welfare function under 
economic diversification. As in the previous case, suppose . Then, by the maximum 
condition we must have , which, noting from (20) that 
* 0 E >
*** (,,)0 E ESλ Ψ
−=
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HES cE Et HES f Kt
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)
   (22) 
  
  Interestingly, condition (22) is essentially the same as condition (15) of the previous 
case, with , the marginal product of labor, now corresponding to
* (( ) fK t ω , the outside wage 




 16Proposition 3: If 00 ) () ( f KS ω ≥ , then , i.e. the resource stock never declines below 
the initial stock level on an optimal path. 
≥
*() St S 0
Proof: Since ,  0 K ≥   *
0 (( ) ) () ( ) 0 . f Kt fK S ω ≥≥ So, if  =
*
0 () St S , then  .■  ≥  *() 0 St
 
Accordingly, economic diversification can lead the community to a sustainable full 
employment path as long as the initial grant of capital is not less than a certain minimum level, 
specifically
1
0 [( ) ] 0 K fS ω


















  The economic intuition for this result is similar to that of Proposition 2, once we note 
that in the present case the manufacturing wage rate, which is determined by 
along the optimal path, plays the same role as the outside wage rate 
* () ( () ) tf K t ω = ω  in the 
previous case (see (16)). Since the manufacturing wage rate increases over time as capital stock 
is accumulated, an initial stock of capital that meets the minimum required level ensures that 
along the optimal path the manufacturing wage rate is always sufficiently high to (optimally) 
absorb what would otherwise be excess effort in the resource sector. Since , the 
comparative statics results obtained in the previous case for
()0 fK ′ >
0 () S ω   apply equally to the 
minimum required capital stock, 
1
0 (( ) ) 0 K fS ω
− = . In particular, if the initial resource stock is 
very small, then a very large initial capital stock will be required to achieve a full employment 
sustainable path of resource use.  This yields a general lesson for policymakers in the poor, 
resource-based developing countries; namely, the economic cost of achieving sustainability 
can significantly rise if appropriate remedial policies are not adopted early on. On the other 
hand, perhaps ironically, this result also shows that contrary to the view sometimes expressed 
by radical ecologists, industrialization and accumulation of manmade capital not only need not 
be at odds with the objective of resource sustainability, it can in fact facilitate it, at least in the 
context of RRB economies studied here. 
 
 5. Conclusion 
  In this paper we have focused on poor rural communities that depend on a renewable 
natural resource and provided an alternative explanation why such communities may choose a 
path of resource extraction that leads to extinction in a finite time. We have argued that in 
resource-based communities, being employed is a communal norm and as such a source of 
belonging and identity that confers socio-psychological benefits to members, and that the 
existence of these benefits as an integral part of the community’s overall welfare can explain 
 17the community’s strong desire (or even obsession) for full employment and its resistance to 
curbing the supply of “effort” (as frequently observed in fishing and forest communities). 
Embedding this argument into a standard bionomic model of optimal renewable resource 
extraction, we have shown that the communal norm of work combined with the lack of 
alternative income sources and the biological constraint on growth of the resource stock can 
interact to induce the community to choose a resource extraction path that results in resource 
extinction in finite time. Thus, our analysis offers an example of situations where the 
persistence of a social norm and benefits stemming from it (here the non-pecuniary benefits of 
employment) in the face of changing conditions (here the declining of the resource stock) can 
lead to a socially adverse outcome (here the resource extinction in a finite time).   
  Clearly, it is unrealistic to expect either the communal norm of full employment or the 
biological resource growth constraint to change in the short run. Therefore, one has to rely on 
economic policy to induce these communities towards a path of resource extraction that is both 
sustainable and compatible with the goal of full employment. We have shown that in principle 
successful economic policies would aim at providing the community with alternative 
employment sources either through employment opportunities outside the community 
(including labor migration) or by diversifying the community’s economy by creating an 
indigenous capital-based economic activity. In either case, to be successful, the policies must 
ensure that the outside wage rate or the initial capital stock granted to the community do not fall 
below a certain minimum level, which depends on the existing size of the resource stock, on the 
characteristics of the community’s harvesting technology, and on the biological growth 
characteristics of the resource in question.  
  No doubt the model developed in this paper is highly simplified, thus suggesting 
several important directions for its extensions and future research. At a technical level, several 
possible extensions of the present model are noteworthy. For one thing, it would be interesting 
to relax the assumption of a constant population size and examine how the pressure of a 
growing population may exacerbate the problem of finite resource extinction and complicate 
the design of potential policies to avoid it.  It would also be interesting to examine how the 
condition for finite time resource extinction would change if one departed from Cobb-Douglas 
specifications of the community’s preferences and harvesting technology. Would, for example, 
greater elasticities of substitution between constituents of the community’s well-being or 
between inputs in the harvesting technology lessen the possibility of resource extinction or 
accentuate it? How would they affect the policies to restore sustainability?  Similarly, how 
would a more general specification of the social welfare function that differentiates the 
consumption of the resource from that of the manufactured consumption good, or a more 
general production function in the latter sector, affect our main conclusions? At a policy level, 
it would be interesting to consider a situation, perhaps not too unrealistic in the poor developing 
 18nations, in which no benevolent outside agency (public or private) may concern itself about the 
plight of possible resource extinction, so that the community has to rely on itself to come up 
with a remedial policy.  One such policy could involve foregoing the full employment objective 
for some time and reducing the “effort” by a communal agreement to lay off some of the labor 
force, or shorten the length of individuals’ activity period, in order to achieve a full 
employment sustainable path in the log run. What are the conditions for the community to 
reach such a binding agreement, given possible intergenerational conflicts of interests between 
employment and consumption?  What would be the optimal shape of such an agreement (i.e., 
how much to reduce the effort at any time and for how long)? Also, it would be rewarding to 
explore socio-political and economic-organizational policies that could in the long run alter the 
underlying community’s preferences or harvesting technology so as to avoid resource 
extinction. Finally, of particular value will be empirical research into the magnitude of the 


























A1. Proof of Proposition 1 
We first prove the following lemma: 
Lemma 1: Assume that problem (2) has a solution for each ∈[0, ] Sk . If   
for all
((,) ,,) 0 EE ES S λλ Ψ>  
, S 0 λ > , the optimal path is full employment obsession path. 
Proof: Ψ  implies that the maximum condition is satisfied at the corner; 
so,
((,) ,,) 0 EE ES S λλ >  
= 0 and/or  EE = E . Thus, the optimal policy    for the problem (2) 
satisfies
*() ES
*() { 0 , } ES E ∈ . Notice that this implies there is no optimal interior steady state. 
Let be the maximum stock level such that ∈ ˆ [0, ] Sk =
*() ES E for all . By 
Assumption (A3), an optimal path from   decreases monotonically over time, but by 
definition of  it cannot fall below . Therefore  should be an optimal steady state. However 
cannot be interior.   is obviously suboptimal. Thus, we conclude that . That is, 
∈ ˆ (,] SS k
∈ 0 ˆ [,] SS k
ˆ S ˆ S ˆ S
ˆ S = ˆ Sk ˆ 0 S =
=
*() ES E  for all (0, ] Sk ∈ .■ 
Proof of Proposition 1： 
Since    λ Ψ=−        (,,) (,) ( (,) / (,) ) (,) , ES w ES w ES H ES H ES  
EE EE E E EE
EE > ((,) ,,) 0 ES S λλ Ψ   is equivalent to (6). Thus the statement is true by Lemma 1. ■ 
 
A2. Finite Time Exhaustion 
Proposition A1: LetS
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goes to zero within a finite time.  
 
Proof: Notice that  () (,) SG S H E S r S E S
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of 0 , (0) rE
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 and thus 
also goes to zero within a finite time. Note that since (; ) StS <  (; ) 0 StS 0 0 t→∞ , lim ( ; ) 0 StS = is 
obvious, and we can arbitrarily choose an sufficiently small initial value.■ 
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It is easily seen that .■  (;) ( 2 ) / 0 SS gS r k γβ =− − <    
 
A3. On the Existence of Optimal Paths 
We apply the Romer’s Theorem (Romer, 1986) to prove the existence, because the theorem is 
applicable to a non-convex problem as in our model. 
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Since we have assumed (1 ) 0 EC η αη −−> , ω is convex inS . Hence, to apply the theorem, we 
introduce an “artificial” argument, 
 
  such that  τ τ −≡ ∫
          ()  () () () ,
t
s St St Ss S d  
and rewrite as . Notice that in order for to exist almost everywhere, S must 
be absolutely continuous. This restriction is a cost of applying the Romer’s Theorem. Another 
restriction is that we have to assume that is essentially bounded, i.e. there exists a real 
number such that 
(,) SS ω   (,,) SSS ω      S     
S   
M <   
t³0
ess.sup | ( )| St M. The Romer’s Theorem ensures the existence of 
 21optimal paths if the following two conditions are met: 
(1)   is upper-semi continuous and  is concave for all ,  (,,) SSS ω      (,, ) SS ω   i
2 (,) SS ∈    
(2) There is a real number such that  holds almost 
everywhere on[0 and for all( .  
m ω ≤−          ( ( ), ( ), ( )) | ( )| St St St m St
, ) ∞ ( ), ( ), ( )) St St St     
Our model obviously satisfies the first condition. For the second condition, notice that there is 
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